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This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium analysis of stock market development, providing a theoretical support 
for the empirical positive correlation between equity markets development and economic growth. If potential investors 
are unable to distinguish between good (high productivity) and bad (low productivity) firms, then problems of adverse 
selection may arise, leading to a low price of equities as bad firms are attracted to the market and good firms are driven 
from the market – the dilution cost of asymmetric information (Bolton and Freixas. 2000). As a consequence, average 
productivity will be depressed and the economy will evolve along a relatively low growth path.  The greater is the degree 
of asymmetric information, the greater will be the severity of the problem due to a greater (lower) number of bad (good) 
firms exploiting investment opportunities. Problems of asymmetric information are likely to become less acute as an 
economy develops and more resources become available for allowing investors to identify good firms and for allowing 
good firms to signal their own identity.  Under such circumstances, the price of equities rise, attracting an increasing 
number of good firms to the equity market which, in turn, has a positive feedback effect on capital accumulation and 
growth.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
By simply observing the composition of the financial systems in different countries, one 
cannot help but notice that the size of the stock market relative to the size of the total financial 
sector is much larger in more advanced economies than in poorer ones. In addition, the 
expansion of stock markets is characterised not only by an increase in the total number of 
firms listed, but also by an increase in the level of market capitalisation. These observations, 
documented by Atje and Jovanovich (1993), Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996a,b), 
Korajczyk (1996), Levine and Zervos (1996) (1998), point to the existence of a strong 
positive correlation between stock market development and economic growth. At present, 
there are very few theoretical studies that seek to explain this correlation. Moreover, those 
that do tend to focus on only one direction of causality in the relationship – either from stock 
markets to growth or vice versa. Yet, there is a strong presumption that causality runs both 
ways – that changes in the structure of the financial system both determine, and are 
determined by, changes in the level of real activity. This paper presents a dynamic general 
equilibrium analysis of stock market development, providing rigorous support for this 
presumption.  
According to Levine (1991), the existence of liquidity costs is the fundamental reason 
for why equity market activity can affect the real allocation of resources. Agents might not be 
willing to tie-up their resources in long term investments even though the returns on these 
investments may be high compared to others. By offering the opportunity to trade ownership 
of projects without disrupting the productive process, equities help to channel resources 
towards these investments and, thus, spur economic growth. In a similar vein, Bencivenga, 
Smith and Starr (1996) show that, by reducing transaction costs, the development of equity 
markets can increase the amount of investment in projects with longer maturity periods and 
thereby, exert a positive effect on capital accumulation. From the opposite perspective, Boyd 
and Smith (1998) analyse the way in which capital accumulation and growth might stimulate 
the development of stock markets. In a "costly state verification" framework, where agents 
have access to two technologies, it is shown that, when growth occurs, agents are driven by 
lower expected verification costs to use more intensively an observable technology financed 
by equity and less intensively an unobservable technology financed by debt.  
In extending the above literature to the case in which stock market development and 
real economic activity are determined jointly, we build upon the microeconomic framework 
  2of Bolton and Frexias (2000), who study the optimal choice of financial contract in an 
environment of asymmetric information. When firms have superior information about the 
returns on their investments, the costs associated with the optimal security used to finance 
those investments depend on the degree of informational asymmetry. This is simply because 
lenders, who cannot a priori observe project returns, average among all possible outcomes. 
As in a typical lemons' market, owners of projects with high returns will be penalised since 
their projects will be valued at the lower average price. This is referred to as the dilution cost 
of asymmetric information. Under such circumstances, Bolton and Frexias (2000) show that 
firms' optimal capital structure consists essentially of two forms of securities: equity and/or 
debt. Whichever type of security is issued depends on the level of dilution costs, together with 
the level of bankruptcy costs associated with the loss of future income following the 
borrower’s inability to repay debt.  
An important feature of the above framework is that the degree of informational 
asymmetry, or dilution, is treated as exogenous. In the analysis that follows, this is no longer 
true. Assume that different types of firm have access to different sets of projects with different 
expected returns. Assume, also, that the return on all, or some, of these projects depend on 
specific market conditions. If lenders know which firms prefer to operate which project, then 
the set of projects undertaken will signal precisely the nature and the types of firms in the 
market. If, on the other hand, some firms have access to common projects, then the types of 
firms in the market can be inferred only probabilistically by observing the projects. The 
higher is the number of firms accessing the same sets of projects, the lower will be the 
probability of correctly inferring a firms’ type. Now, if the set of “common projects” 
undertaken becomes smaller for some reason (e.g. because some of these projects become 
economically inefficient), then the signal from the market becomes stronger and the 
possibility of inferring a firm’s type becomes easier. This is the mechanism by which the 
degree of informational asymmetry is endogenised in the model. The link with growth arises 
from the fact that capital accumulation reduces the incentive of low productivity firms to 
operate projects that are typical of high productivity firms. Thus, capital accumulation leads 
to an improvement in the "visibility" of more efficient firms. 
The market value of a project reflects the level of information available in the market. 
Under the assumption that the same project yields different returns to different firms (e.g. 
because some firms are more efficient than others), the value attached by the market to a 
project will depend on which types of firms find it optimal to operate that project. If a project 
is run only by high productivity firms, then the market value will be high. On the other hand, 
  3if the project is run by some less efficient firms, then its value will be lower, or “diluted”. 
This dilution cost is one of the factors that determines the optimal choice of one form of 
security over another. The other factor is a bankruptcy cost. Given that dilution costs are 
mainly associated with equity, while bankruptcy costs are wholly relevant to debt, changes in 
the relative levels of these costs induce changes in the optimal choice of security. In 
particular, the reduction of dilution costs along the path of capital accumulation can spur the 
development of equity markets. This appears to come close to what actually happens in many 
economies. Even if it is very difficult to measure the degree of information asymmetry or the 
level of information dilution, it is undeniable that information travels faster and is more easily 
diffused in relatively advanced economies, where stock market are more developed.  
As already indicated, the model also contains a feed back effect from stock market 
development to growth. This follows from the fact that the incentive of firms to access a 
specified set of projects depends on the financial contracting regime. Accordingly, the model 
provides an account of the joint determination of the degree of informational asymmetry, the 
structure of the financial system and the level of real economic activity.  
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe the physical set up of the 
economy in terms of agents' preferences, technologies and endowments. In Section 3, we 
study the functioning of the capital market under the assumptions of asymmetric information 
between borrowers and lenders. In Section 4, we analyse the optimal choice between debt and 
equity contracts. In Section 5, we characterise the general equilibrium of the economy and 
identify the feed back effects between stock market development and growth. In section 6, we 
offer some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Environment 
 
We consider an overlapping generations economy in which there is a constant population  
(normalised to 3) of two-period lived, non altruistic agents. Each generation is divided at birth 
into a unit mass of households (workers or lenders), a unit mass of firms producing capital 
(investors or borrowers) and a unit mass of firms producing final output (manufacturers of 
goods). All agents are risk neutral and derive utility only from old-age consumption. Young 
households are endowed with one unit of labour which is supplied inelastically to old output 
producers of the previous generation in return for the wage wt  (measured in units of 
consumption goods). This income can be stored or lent out to young capital producers. The 
  4storage technology of households converts one unit of output at time t into one unit of output 
at time t+1. Capital is produced by young borrowers through the operation of risky projects 
financed by loans from young households. Output is produced by old entrepreneurs by 
employing the labour of young households and capital produced from risky projects in the 
previous period.  
A risky project requires a fixed amount of output, a, at time t, to produce a stochastic 
amount of output at time t+1, according to a linear probability distribution which depends on 
a borrower’s type. A skilled type of borrower obtains κ1 units of capital with probability p, 
and zero units of capital with probability 1−p. An unskilled type of borrower obtains κ2<κ1 
units of capital with probability p, and zero units of capital with probability 1−p. We assume 
that rt+1pκ1 > a > rt+1pκ2, where rt+1 is the price of capital next period, which implies that only 
skilled borrowers are creditworthy since only these borrowers receive a positive net expected 
return from project investment. The fraction of skilled (unskilled) borrowers in the total 
borrower population is η  ∈ (0,1) (1−η). In addition to being more efficient in capital 
production, skilled borrowers who run risky projects are also able to acquire entrepreneurial 
(or managerial) expertise which they can supply to final output producers in the second period 
of their lives.
1 While unskilled borrowers cannot acquire such expertise, they are able to make 
use of a storage technology which converts one unit of output at time t into ρ ≥ 1 units of 
output at time t+1.  
Final output in period t+1, yt+1, is produced by old manufacturers according to 
    
1
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;  Θ, Φ > 0; θ, α ∈ (0,1),  (1) 
where kt+1 denotes capital (obtained from firms of the same generation that run projects in 
period t), lt+1 denotes labour (hired from households of the next generation), Kt+1 denotes 
aggregate capital and ht+1 denotes the amount of managerial expertise supplied by skilled 
capital producers of the same generation. The production function in (1) displays increasing 
social returns to scale and learning by doing externality effects. Perfectly competitive markets 
ensure that all factors of production are paid according to their marginal products. Thus, 
,   and 
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+ + Φ=, where wt+1, rt+1, and ωt+1 
are the prices of labour, capital and managerial expertise, respectively. The first two 
expressions can be further simplified by recalling that there is a unit mass of firms producing 
                                                 
1 This assumption captures the idea that very good entrepreneurs and managers, recognised as such by the 
market, are employed as consultants by other firms even when they are retired from their main activity. 
  5output and a unit mass of households supplying labour. In equilibrium, therefore,  11 tt Kk ++ =  
and l . It follows that  1 1 t+ =
'( ) 0 ⋅ >
  1 t rr θ + Θ == , (2) 
  11 (1 ) (1 ) tt kK 1 t w θ θ + + −Θ =−Θ =+
) t
. (3) 
As usual, the wage rate is an increasing function of capital,  11 ( t wW K + + = , with W . 
Since the production function in (1) is not homogeneous of degree one, total output will not 
be exhausted by the factors of production, implying that manufacturing firms will make a 
positive level of profit. This profit is given by: 
   1 (1 ) t h 1 t
α πα + + =−Φ . (4) 
 
3. The Credit Market 
 
At the beginning of each period a newly born borrower approaches a newly born lender with 
request for a loan to finance a risky project. Following others (e.g. Bencivenga and Smith, 
1993; Bose and Cothren 1996, 1997) we simplify the analysis by assuming that borrowers and 
lenders are coupled together in randomly matched pairs.
2 A loan contract can involve the 
issue of debt – which requires a fixed lump-sum repayment, dt+1>0, independent of the 
project’s outcome – and/or the issue of equity – which specifies a repayment as a share, 
st+1∈(0,1), of the project’s net profit. Only a debt contract implies the possibility of 
bankruptcy, which occurs when the realised return on the risky technology is lower than the 
required contractual repayment. Note that a lender’s participation constraint in the case of 
debt is given by prdt+1=a, where r is given by  (2); that is, a lender expects to receive pdt+1 
units of capital from a risky project, which can be rented out to final goods producers to earn 
an expected income of prdt+1 units of output; this expected income must be no less than the 
income earned from storage, a, and must be equal to that income, given competition among 
lenders. It follows from the previous restrictions on project returns, rpκ1 > a > rpκ2, that κ1 > 
dt+1 > κ2, so that only skilled borrowers who succeed in the risky projects are able to repay 
their debts and avoid bankruptcy. The repayment of a firm that goes bankrupt is simply the 
capital that has been produced, which is zero units of capital for all types of firm if the project 
fails and κ2 units of capital for unskilled firms if the project succeeds. It also follows that no 
                                                 
2 Hence, it must be the case that wt > a. 
  6lender will, knowingly, make any type of loan – debt or equity – to unskilled firms. Under 
either type of security, the maximum amount of income that a lender would expect to earn is 
rpκ2, which is less than the income that could be earned from storage, a. Thus, the only way 
that unskilled firms can secure loans is to disguise themselves as skilled firms. As such, the 
optimal financial contract will be designed exclusively by the latter. 
The major consequence of bankruptcy for a skilled borrower is the possibility of losing 
all, or part, of his future income from the supply of his managerial expertise to final output 
producers when old. Assuming that the borrower acquires one unit of expertise, then his 
income is ωt+1. If a lender could lay his hands on this income, then the borrower would need 
to pay rdt+1 units of output to substitute for the debt payment, leaving an income of ωt+1 – rdt+1 
units of output. We assume that the borrower can seek to avoid this by severing ties with the 
lender and relocating elsewhere at a cost of ε ∈ (0,1) units of the borrower’s time. If so, then 
the borrower’s net income will be (1−ε)ωt+1. In what follows, we impose the condition rdt+1 > 
εωt+1, which implies that it is always optimal for a borrower to relocate.
3   
Since unskilled borrowers do not acquire any managerial expertise, and since they 
always go bankrupt if they finance their risky projects by issuing debt, their payoff from 
running such projects is always zero. By contrast, they are able to obtain a positive profit by 
revealing their type and asking for funds to invest in their alternative storage technology. It 
follows that unskilled borrowers will never issue debt to run risky projects. Moreover, since 
the storage technology of unskilled borrowers dominates the storage technology of lenders, a 
lender will find it optimal to lend his entire wage in return for a debt payment that satisfies 
= w 1 t d + %
t+1. Under such circumstances, the borrower will obtain a net income of ρwt+1− 1 t d + % = 
(ρ−1)wt+1, where ρ ≥ 1 is recalled to be the return on the borrower’s storage technology.   
In the case of equity, an unskilled borrower does not end up with a zero payoff if he 
runs a risky project. In the event of success he retains (1−st+1)κ2 units of capital as profit. His 
profit from running the storage technology, financed by equity, would be  1 (1 ) tt ws ρ + − % , where 
1 tt t ws w ρ + = %  in accordance with the lender’s participation constraint for this technology. As 
above, therefore, the borrower’s net income from this technology is (ρ −1)wt. It follows that, 
in the case of equity, an unskilled borrower faces a trade-off between revealing his type (and 
                                                 
3 Making use of some results derived later, it ca be shown that this condition is satisfied by imposing the 
parameter restriction 
11 [( 1) ( 1 ) ] ap p p
αα εαε η
− − >Φ + −− . 
  7running the storage technology), or concealing his type (and running the risky technology). 
He will be indifferent between these courses of action if 
  12 (1 ) ( 1 ) tt ws p r ρ κ + −= − , (5) 
When, (5) holds, an unskilled borrower randomises between risky and storage technologies. 
In what follows, we denote by λt the fraction of unskilled borrowers running risky capital 




4. The Optimal Financial Contract 
 
It has been established that, when seeking a loan to finance a risky project, an unskilled 
borrower will never issue debt, but may issue equity. Thus, while the issue of debt 
immediately reveals a borrower to be skilled, the issue of equity provides an imprecise signal 
about the borrower’s type. Only in the case of equity, therefore, do problems of asymmetric 
information arise. Our next objective is to determine the degree of informational asymmetry, 
and the effect of this on firms’ optimal capital structure and allocation of resources between 
the different investment technologies.  
Let γt denote the fraction of skilled borrowers participating in the equity market. The 
fraction of unskilled borrowers participating in this market was defined above as λt. Since the 
total population of skilled (unskilled) borrowers is η (1−η), then the probability that a lender 











 .  (6) 
The variable zt can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of information dilution in the 
economy. It may be written as the function zt = Z(γt, λt) ∈ (0,1), where Zγ > 0 and Zλ < 0. 
Thus, if the fraction of skilled borrowers issuing equities in the total population of firms 
issuing equities increases (i.e. if γt  increases and/or λt decreases), then the degree of 
information dilution decreases as the “visibility” of skilled firms in the market improves. In 
the limiting case of λt = 0, zt = 1 since only skilled firms issue equity in this instance.  
As one might expect, the value that the market attaches to a risky project will be a 
function of the degree of information dilution. Each lender takes account of the fact that an 
  8issuer of equity might be either a skilled or an unskilled capital producer. A project will be 
valued, therefore, as a weighted average of the possible returns,  12 (1 ) tt zp z p κ κ +− . Given 
this, together with a lender’s binding participation (or zero profit) constraint under 
competition,  , it is straightforward to determine the amount of 
equity that a skilled borrower must issue in order to take on a risky project; that is, 
11 [( 1 ) tt t ar sz p z p κ + =+ − 2 ] κ
  1









Thus, the required amount of equity is a decreasing function of the degree of information 
dilution,  , where  . Intuitively, an increase in z 1 () t sS z + =
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t (i.e. a decrease in 
information dilution) causes the market value of projects to increase (as skilled entrepreneurs 
become more “visible”), thereby reducing the amount of equity needed to be raised to cover 
the fixed initial outlay, a. The expected payoff to a skilled entrepreneur issuing equity is given 
by   (where it is recalled that  1
E p





+ + Φ=, the price of 
managerial skills, of which the entrepreneur has one unit, which is supplied to final goods 






















+ Φ . (8) 
In contrast to the above, debt contracts do not involve any information dilution costs 
since they are issued only by skilled borrowers. In this case, a lender’s participation constraint 
is simply prdt+1=a, implying that a skilled borrower needs to issue an amount of debt equal to 




+ = . (9) 
Debt contracts involve bankruptcy costs, however. These costs are incurred by a skilled 
borrower when the project fails and the borrower is unable to make the debt repayment. 
Under such circumstances, the borrower defaults by moving location, but sacrifices a fraction, 
ε, of his managerial income. Given this, then the expected payoff to a skilled borrower issuing 
debt is Vr 11 1 ()
D
tt p d κ ++ =− +
1
1 [( 1) ( 1 ) ] t p p
α εαh
−
+ +− − Φ . Together with (9), this yields:  
 
1
11 [( 1) ( 1 ) ]
D
t Vr pa p p h
α κ 1 t ε α
−
+ =− + + −− Φ + . (10) 
The expressions in (8) and (10) contain the variable ht+1 which is the total amount of 
managerial expertise supplied by skilled producers of capital. A producer who issues equity 
supplies one unit of expertise with certainty, while a producer who issues debt supplies one 
unit with probability p (when the project succeed) and 1−ε units with probability 1−p (when 
  9the project fails). Since the total population of skilled producers issuing equity (debt) is γtη 
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Evidently, a skilled borrower will find it optimal to issue only equity (debt) if 
 ( VV ). For both types of security to co-exist, borrowers must be 
indifferent between them, implying VV
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. (13) 
Since zt = Z(γt, λt) by virtue of (6), then (13) implicitly defines a relationship between γt and λt 
for which skilled borrowers are indifferent between debt and equity. Under such 
circumstances, these borrowers randomise between the two contracts, issuing equity with 
probability  γt  ∈ (0,1) and debt with probability 1−γt, for a given value of λt. Another 
relationship between γt and λt is obtained from (5) which, in conjunction with (7), may be 
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This is a relationship between γt and λt for which unskilled borrowers are indifferent between 
running risky projects (financed through equity) by disguising themselves as skilled 
borrowers, and running the storage technology. Under such circumstances, these borrowers 
randomise between the two technologies, adopting the former with probability λt and the 
latter with probability 1−λt.   
The expressions in (13) and (14) determine, jointly, the  equilibrium values of γt and λt 
for a given wage rate, wt. A detailed analysis of these expressions is contained in the 
Appendix and summarised in Figure 1. The curve f(γt) is obtained from (13) which, under 
  10appropriate parameter restrictions, gives λt as an increasing and concave function of γt. The 
curve g(γt) is derived from (14) which defines λt as a linear function of γt.  
The intersection of these curves determines the equilibrium pair ( ˆt γ , ˆ
t λ ), explicit solutions for 
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  Fig. 1 
  11Given the above, it is possible to see how changes in real economic activity can affect 
the structure of the financial system. The slope of the g(⋅) curve, and hence the intersection of 
this curve with the f(⋅) schedule, depends on the wage, wt. By virtue of (3), the wage is a 
function of the capital stock, kt. Consequently, changes in the level of capital will cause 
changes in  ˆt γ  and  ˆ
t λ , the equilibrium fractions of skilled firms issuing equity, and the 
equilibrium fraction of unskilled firms participating in the equity market to run risky projects. 
More precisely, an increase in kt causes an increase in wt which induces a downward rotation 
of the g(⋅) schedule. This produces both a higher value of  ˆt γ  and a higher value of  ˆ
t λ , as 
illustrated in Figure 2 and confirmed by (17) and (18). Thus, capital accumulation leads to an 
increase in the fractions of unskilled firms issuing equities. The reason is that an increase in 
the wage rate augments the return on the storage technology. Consequently, the return on the 
risky technology financed with equity must also increase in order to keep unskilled borrowers 
indifferent between the two types of investment. This causes, in turn, a rise in the fraction of 
skilled borrowers issuing equities. The increase in the expected return on equity is such that it 
more than compensates the initial increase in the return on storage, with the result that the 
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Although  γt and λt have opposite effects on zt (see (6)), it is possible to deduce that, as 
the equilibrium values of these variables increase with capital accumulation, the equilibrium 
degree of information dilution unambiguously falls (i.e.  ˆ ˆ ˆ (,) tt zZ t γ λ = increases). According to 
(5), an increase in the wage, wt, must be associated with a reduction in the issue of equity, st+1, 
if unskilled borrowers are to remain indifferent between risky and storage technologies. By 
virtue of (7), this means that zt must rise, which is equivalent to implying that the degree of 
information dilution must fall. In terms of Figure 2, a rotation of the g(⋅) schedule causes  ˆ
t λ  to 
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Fig. 3   
 
 
  13The foregoing analysis has focused on the case in which the model generates interior 
solutions,  ˆt γ ∈(0,1) and  ˆ
t λ ∈(0,1). Yet it is also possible for corner solutions to arise, as 
illustrated in Figure 3. For example, at very low levels of capital (and therefore very low 
levels of wages) a market for equity may not exist because unskilled borrowers have no 
incentive to run the storage technology, preferring instead to operate projects by pretending to 
be skilled borrowers and applying for equity finance. This is the case in which the g(⋅) 
schedule is so steep as to never intersect the f(⋅) schedule (except at γt = λt = 0). At the 
opposite extreme, sufficiently high levels of capital may imply the non-existence of a debt 
market as all skilled borrowers prefer to issue equity. This is the case in which the g(⋅) 
schedule intersects the f(⋅) schedule at γt >1 which is not feasible (so that γt =1 and λt is then 
determined by (14)). 
 
5. Capital accumulation 
 
In contrast to existing models, the present framework admits the prospect of two-way 
causality in the relationship between stock market development and economic growth. That 
is, capital accumulation both influences, and is influenced by, the financial contracting 
regime. This may be established as follows.  
Capital is produced by both skilled and unskilled borrowers from the operation of risky 
projects. All skilled borrowers run these projects, producing a total of κ1 units of capital with 
probability p and zero units of capital with probability 1−p. Within the population of unskilled 
borrowers, only the fraction  ˆ
t λ  run risky projects, producing a total of (1−η)κ2 units of capital 
with probability p, and zero units of capital with probability 1−p. Applying the law of large 
number, it is possible to deduce the aggregate stock of capital at time t+1 as 
  11 2 ˆ (1 ) t Kp p t κ ηκ η + =+ − λ  (19) 
This expression shows that the path of capital accumulation depends on the fraction of 
unskilled borrowers issuing equities to run risky projects. By virtue of (18) this fraction is an 
increasing function of the wage rate ( '( ) 0 t w Λ > ), which, in turn, is an increasing function of 
capital from (3). Hence, the capital stock at time t+1 is unambiguously an increasing function 
of the capital stock at time t. The precise shape of this capital accumulation path depends on 
the properties of  .   ( ) t w Λ
  14The mutual interaction between real and financial activity is now evident from (19) and 
the preceding analysis of the determination of  ˆt γ  and  ˆ
t λ . At the beginning of each period 
skilled borrowers decide whether to finance their risky projects through the issue of debt or 
equity. The return on each financial contract depends on the level of asymmetric information 
which influences both the level of dilution costs (relevant to equity) and expected bankruptcy 
cost (relevant to debt). Unskilled borrowers deciding to run risky projects issue only equity 
and disguise themselves as skilled borrowers. The fraction of skilled and unskilled borrowers 
issuing equities determine the equilibrium degree of informational asymmetry at which 
skilled borrowers are indifferent between equity and debt, and unskilled borrowers are 
indifferent between running their storage technology and running risky projects. This is the 
only level of informational asymmetry compatible with an equilibrium in which equity and 
debt co-exist. A different value would make one financial contract dominate the other and 
would cause all borrowers to opt for one technology or the other. As the wage rate increases 
because of capital accumulation, the return on the storage increases and this modifies the 
incentive of unskilled borrowers to access the equity market. The return on the risky 
technology for these borrowers must increase in order to keep them indifferent between the 
two alternative technologies. This requires a reduction in dilution costs and, therefore, a 
decrease in the degree of information asymmetry. As a consequence, the equilibrium fractions 
of both skilled and unskilled borrowers issuing equities increases.  
As indicated earlier, it is possible to obtain an equilibrium in which only one type of 
loan market – equity or debt – is active. At sufficiently low levels of capital, only a debt 
market may exist in which case  ˆ
t λ = 0 and the economy may be trapped in a state of low 
financial and low real development. This outcome occurs if the steady state level of capital 
when  ˆ
t λ = 0 (given by   from (19) ) is lower than the level of capital needed to support 
equity market. At sufficiently high level of capital, the opposite may occur and only an equity 
market may exist, implying a relatively advanced state of real and financial development. 
1 / pκη δ
 
6. Final Considerations 
 
A large body of empirical evidence has shown the existence of a clear pattern in the 
evolution of financial markets in many economies. One aspect of this pattern is the 
development of financial intermediation and the substitution of indirect lending for direct 
  15lending. Another feature is the development of stock markets and the increasing use of equity 
as an alternative to debt in financing investments. Only recently, have economists begun to 
model this latter phenomenon using insights of modern finance theory and techniques of 
modern dynamic general equilibrium analysis. The purpose of this paper has been to extend 
the existing literature by developing a framework that admits two-way causality in the 
relationship between stock markets and growth, and which, therefore, provides a theory of the 
co-evolution of real and financial sector activity.  
One of the prerequisites for the Modigliani-Miller theorem is the assumption of fully 
informed agents. In the presence of asymmetric information, the theorem fails to hold and a 
firm's capital structure is no longer independent of its productivity and efficiency. As a 
consequence, the financial contract, through which firms obtain loans to finance their 
investments, is intimately linked with the returns on these investment. In other words, 
asymmetric information implies that different financial contracts involve different costs. 
Given this, then one of the major problems facing firms is the determination of their optimal 
capital structures and the minimisation of the associated costs.  
When firms have different levels of efficiency and private information about the 
expected return on their investments, the optimal security to issue is either debt or equity. 
Each of these securities involves a different type of cost: a bankruptcy cost in the case of debt, 
and a dilution cost in the case of equity. Dilution costs arise because of the typical "lemons' 
market" problem. Relatively efficient firms see the market value of their projects diluted 
because of the presence of relatively inefficient firms. The higher is the proportion of 
inefficient firms, the lower is the visibility of efficient ones and the higher is the degree of 
information asymmetry. 
The model presented in this paper has the distinction of endogenising the degree of 
asymmetric information. The presence of less efficient firms in the equity market is driven by 
the incentive of these firms to invest in alternative projects. With capital accumulation, these 
incentives change and so does the fraction of such firms accessing the equity market. Even if 
this fraction increases, however, the degree of informational asymmetry falls. This is because 
the fraction of efficient firms accessing the equity market increases more than proportionally. 
The final effect of capital accumulation is an overall increase in the number of firms issuing 
equities to finance their investment. This has a feedback effect on capital accumulation itself, 
so that the real and financial sectors of the economy evolve together. 
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Appendix  
 
The following analysis is concerned with the properties of (13) and (14) in (γt,λt) space. 
Time subscripts are omitted for simplicity.  
Substituting (6) into (13) gives: 
  12 1 2 [ ( 1) ]( 1) ( ) T 0 a γηκ λ η κ λ η κ κ +− −− −=  (A.1) 
where 
1 (1 ) [1 (1 ) (1 )] Tp p
αα 1 εαε γ η
− − =− Φ −− −
12 2 [ ( ) ] aT
. Equation (A.1) gives λ = f(γ). Provided that 
(1 ) η κκ κ −− −  > 0, then λ > 0. Given this, then implicit differentiation of (A.1) 
reveals that  
  12 ' () 0 [ 1 ( 1 )( 1 ) ] ( 1 ) ( 1 )( 1 ) fp p γ ηκ ε γ λ η κ ε α > <=> − − − > − − −  (A.2)   
We assume that this condition is always satisfied (a sufficient condition for which is that it is 
satisfied at γ  = 0 and λ = 1). The same parameter restrictions ensure that  ''( ) 0 f γ < , in which 
case f(γ) is increasing and concave function. 
Equation (14) gives λ = g(γ), where  '( ) 0 g γ >  and  ''( ) 0 g γ = , so that   is a linear 
function of γ. Provided that 












, then λ > 0.  
From (17) and (18), interior solutions, or  ˆ γ ∈ (0,1) and  ˆ λ ∈ (0,1), are obtained if 
11 1 α
12 2 2 12 2 2
1
11
[1 (1 ) ] [ ] (1 ) (1 )
[1 (1 ) ] ( 1) ( 1)





ε κκ κ ε α κ η κκ κ ε α κ η
εκ ρ κ ρ
−
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